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International and Domestic Airline Disasters
American Airlines Flight 587
On November 12, 2001, an Airbus A300 aircraft headed to the
Dominican Republic was climbing out of New York’s JFK
Airport when the vertical stabilizer broke off in mid-air
causing the plane to break apart as it fell from the sky
killing all 260 passengers and flight crew on board. Parts
of the aircraft fell in a residential neighborhood in Belle
Harbor, NY and 5 people were killed by falling debris. The
litigation proceeded against both the aircraft manufacturer
for design failures, and the airline for actions taken by
the flight crew. Due to his extensive background and
experience in complex multi-party aviation disaster
litigation, Mitch Baumeister was named Co-Lead Counsel of
the Plaintiffs’ Committee by the Honorable Judge Robert
Sweet. He and members of the firm were charged with the
responsibility to work on behalf of all of the cases filed
as a result of the disaster and prove that American Airlines
and Airbus were liable to pay damages to the passengers and
ground victims.
Our lawyers reviewed hundreds of thousands of documents
produced by the defendants and conducted dozens of
depositions in the United States and overseas. We
complemented the investigation conducted by the National
Transportation Safety Board with the retention of dozens of
experts from a variety of disciplines, including those with
extensive backgrounds in cockpit resource management and
training, and engineering specialists familiar with the
design and manufacture of the aircraft. Due to the unusual
circumstance of the vertical stabilizer breaking off of the
aircraft during climb, the case was vigorously defended by
each of the defendants who asserted cross claims against
each other which complicated the case even further. Mr.
Baumeister was selcted by the Court to conduct all of the
initial settlement negotiations with the defendants on
behalf of select plaintiffs, who were represented by other
attorneys from the Plaintiffs Steering Committee.
After several years of discovery and motions, the case was
readied for trial, at which time the defendants negotiated
substantial settlements with each of the firm’s clients to
avoid a public trial.
Egypt Air
Flight 990
Approximately 30 minutes after taking off from New York’s
JFK Airport on October 31, 1999, Egypt Air Flight 990, a
Boeing 767 bound for Cairo, Egypt with 217 people on board,
including 100 Americans, entered into a rapid descent and
crashed into the Atlantic Ocean sixty miles southwest of
Nantucket Island. Within two weeks, the National
Transportation Safety Board began well-publicized
discussions with representatives of the Egyptian government
over the probability that the crash had been intentionally
caused by a member of the flight crew. The cockpit voice
recorder installed inside the cockpit of the plane revealed
that a few minutes after reaching its assigned cruising
altitude, the relief crew first officer entered the flight
deck and informed the command first officer that he was
being relieved, three hours earlier than his anticipated
time would have been to begin his relief first officer
duties. Shortly after this flight crew exchange, the command
pilot is heard stating he was going to step out of the
cockpit to use the restroom. What follows on the cockpit
voice recorder includes a series of clicks indicating
changes into the aircraft’s flight control coordinates which
resulted in a drastic change to the aircraft’s altitude and
pitch, as well as repeated statements by the relief first
officer which translated into “I rely on God”. The command
pilot is heard banging on the cockpit door asking as to what
is going on inside the cockpit. He eventually reenters the
cockpit after the relief first officer has shut down the
aircraft engines and attempts to regain control of the
doomed aircraft as it falls to the ocean.
The firm was retained to represent the families of several
of the passengers killed on board the flight. During the
discovery phase of the litigation, lawyers from Baumeister
& Samuels took the depositions of dozens of Egypt Air
employees, as well depositions of employees of the New York
City hotel where the air carrier’s flight crews rested
between flights. During these depositions, they obtained
testimony as to the mental instability and precarious life
of the relief first officer. Following this testimony,
substantial amounts of money were paid to the firm’s clients
as compensation for the deaths of their loved ones.
Swissair Flight
111, Halifax
An MD-11 aircraft operating as Swissair Flight 111 was
approximately one hour into flight from JFK Airport in New
York to Geneva, Switzerland on September 2, 1998 when the
crew reported the presence of smoke in the cockpit. For
almost thirty minutes, the flight crew reviewed the
airplanes flight manuals trying to troubleshoot the source
of the smoke instead of executing an immediate emergency
landing. The smoke condition soon evolved into fire in the
cockpit causing the flight crew to lose control of the plane
and the aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near
Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia killing all 229 people on board.
The Canadian Transportation Board took the lead in the
investigation into the cause of the crash and ultimately
determined that the fire may have been started by the
ignition of the aircraft’s insulation.
Baumeister & Samuels represented the families of both US
and European citizens in litigation that was ultimately
consolidated and transferred to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to be overseen by the Chief Judge. One of the
firm’s clients, Jake LaMotta, renowned boxing champion,
retained the firm shortly after the crash occurred and
instructed us to take whatever actions were necessary to
uncover the reason why his only son, Joe, was killed while
traveling to Geneva on family business. Lawyers from the
firm assumed leading roles in prosecuting the case armed
with knowledge and prior litigation experience with the
wiring contained in MD-11 aircraft. It was well known within
the aviation industry that the wiring had a history of short
circuits, arcing, fire and smoke in cockpits. In 1996 and
1997, the Federal Aviation Administration issued directives
warning that wiring problems could cause catastrophic fires
such as what occurred on Swissair Flight 111. The firm’s
reputation and expertise enabled it to negotiate substantial
settlements for all of its clients.
TWA Flight 800
On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 took off from John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York headed for a stop
over in Paris, France before arriving at its ultimate
destination in Rome, Italy. On board were 230 crew members
and passengers, including students who belonged to the
French Club at a high school in Montoursville, Pennsylvania.
Although the 747 was originally scheduled to depart at 7:00
PM, a mismatch involving a piece of luggage loaded on board
which was unassociated to any passenger delayed its
departure for more than an hour. The last radio transmission
from the aircraft occurred at 8:30 PM when the flight crew
received and acknowledged instructions from New York Center
to climb to 15,000 feet. Less than two minutes later, the
captain of another aircraft in the area reported to air
traffic control that he had seen an explosion ahead of his
position at approximately 16,000 and that he witnessed
flaming debris enter the Moriches Inlet off the coast of
Long Island. The National Transportation Safety Board
received notice that the flight had fallen off radar minutes
later and began what became its most extensive, complex and
expensive air disaster investigation to date.
Within hours of reports that a commercial aircraft was
missing, rampant speculation that either a bomb or missile
was responsible consumed international media outlets. The
FBI quickly joined NTSB investigators at the area closest to
the crash site in East Moriches, New York and began its own
investigation based upon the assumption that a crime had
taken place. Wreckage was strewn across miles of the
Atlantic Ocean and much of it fell to the ocean floor. A
decision was made to recover all of the wreckage and
reconstruct the 747 in a hanger facility on Long Island to
rule out theories and determine the cause of its
destruction.
The “black boxes” - the aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder
and flight data recorder, were recovered and revealed that
approximately two and a half minutes before the flight broke
up mid-flight the captain commented that they were receiving
“crazy” readings from the #4 engine fuel flow gauge. Seconds
before the recording ended, the cockpit voice recorder
indicated two dropouts of background power harmonics which
the NTSB concluded could be the signature of an electrical
arc on cockpit wiring adjacent to the fuel quantity
indicator switch wiring. In addition, the center wing tank
fuel quantity gauge was recovered from the ocean floor and
indicated the presence of 640 pounds of fuel instead of the
300 pounds that had been loaded into the tank. NTSB
experiments showed that applying power to a wire leading to
the fuel quantity gauge can cause the digital display to
change by several hundred pounds before the circuit breaker
trips drawing them to conclude that the gauge anomaly could
have been caused by a short to the fuel quantity indicator
switch wiring.
After several years of painstaking recovery and recreation,
the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the crash was
an explosion of the center wing fuel tank resulting from
ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture contained within
the tank. While the precise source of the explosion’s fuel
energy could not be determined with certainty since not all
wires and components were recovered from the ocean floor,
the NTSB concluded that the most likely source of sufficient
voltage to cause the ignition was a short circuit outside of
the center wing tank that allowed excessive voltage to enter
it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel
quantity indicator switch. Throughout the course of its
investigation, the NTSB issued more than a dozen safety
recommendations covering fuel tank and wiring issues.
Not only did the families of those killed on board TWA
Flight 800 have endure years of rumors and speculation that
a bomb or missile was responsible for their loved ones
deaths until the NTSB was able to announce the result of its
forensic investigation, they also had to fight in court and
through the legislative process for the right to recover
fair and just compensation. Although it was quickly
determined by various investigative agencies that the 747
crashed 8 miles off the coast of Long Island, the battle
over what that meant in terms of the applicable law to be
applied to the claims of the families became the subject of
dozens of court appearances, motions and appeals. After the
majority of wrongful death cases were filed after the
disaster, they were consolidated and transferred to the
Honorable Robert T. Sweet in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. Within months,
lawyers representing TWA and Boeing, the aircraft
manufacturer, sought a court order stating that a federal
statute entitled, Death on the High Seas Act, (“DOHSA”)(46
U.S.C. app. §761-767) should be applied to their claims
since it was the prevailing law in situations where deaths
occurred more than a marine league (3 miles) off shore. At
the time, DOHSA was a very restrictive law which, if applied
by the court, would have limited both the beneficiaries
entitled to recover damages from the defendants from their
loved ones deaths, as well as the amount of their
recoveries, particularly in situations where children were
killed. Lawyers from Baumeister & Samuels worked closely
with other counsel representing families to draft opposition
to the defendants’ motions by arguing that in 1988 President
Ronald Reagan extended the territorial waters of the United
States to 12 miles by Executive Proclamation (54 Fed. Reg.
774 1988). In a case of first impression involving the
factual context of a commercial air disaster, Judge Sweet
denied the defendants’ motion and determined that by using
the term “high seas” Congress intended to limit the scope of
the application of DOHSA to those waters that were not
subject to the laws of any nation. In Re Air Crash Off Long
Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 1998 WL 292333, *11
(S.D.N.Y., June 2, 1998). Two years later, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Sweet’s decision. In
Re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996,
209 F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2000).
While the case made its way through the legal system,
lawyers from our firm worked with the families of those
killed to seek a legislative change in the terms of DOHSA
which, as written at the time, would have prevented the
recovery of monetary damages from the defendants for many of
the victims. After a several year struggle, the statute was
finally amended and signed into law on April 5, 2000 (46
U.S.C. § 30307) excluding commercial air disasters from its
application when a wrongful death occurs on the high seas 12
nautical miles or closer to the shore, and broadening the
measure of damages to include those for loss of care,
comfort and companionship when a wrongful death does occur
on the high seas.
Continental Connection Flight 3407
On February 12, 2009, a Q-400 turboprop aircraft crashed on
final approach to Runway 23 at the Buffalo-Niagara
International Airport in Buffalo, New York. The flight crew
improperly monitored their instrumentation throughout the
descent and approach which placed the aircraft in an unsafe
flight profile. In addition, the flight crew’s response to
the activation of the stick shaker caused the aircraft to
enter an aerodynamic stall from which the pilots could not
recover. All 45 passengers, 4 crew members and 1 individual
on the ground were killed in the crash.
Baumeister & Samuels represented 5 families who lost loved
ones in the crash, and its lawyers were appointed to the
Plaintiffs’ Committee formed to represent the interests of
the families of all of the passengers, and were named
Co-Lead Counsel for the litigation. The firm’s attorneys
undertook a significant effort in preparing the pre-trial
discovery in the litigation and exposing the errors
committed by the flight crew. Instead of focusing on their
piloting responsibilities during the descent and approach to
the airport, the flight crew of Flight 3407 engaged in
non-pertinent conversation in violation of federal aviation
regulations. Under the Federal Aviation Regulations, a
flight crew may not discuss or engage in any non-piloting
communication or activity when the aircraft is in a critical
phase of flight below 10,000 feet. This is referred to as
the sterile cockpit rule. Sadly, violations of the sterile
cockpit rule are a common occurrence in aviation tragedies.
While preparing the aircraft for landing, the pilots
improperly made certain pilot inputs that caused the
premature activation of the stick shaker. The stick shaker
is a device that alerts the flight crew to an impending
aerodynamic stall and requires the flight crew to take steps
to avoid the stall. This usually requires the flight crew to
increase the speed of the aircraft by lowering its nose and
increasing power to the engines.
Due to the improper pilot inputs, however, the stick shaker
activated at a time when the aircraft was not near an
aerodynamic stall. In response to the stick shaker the
captain improperly pulled back on the control yoke which
caused the nose of the aircraft to pitch up, dangerously
slowing the aircraft and causing it to enter an aerodynamic
stall. Pulling back on the control yoke in response to stick
shaker activation was contrary to basic piloting practices.
The flight crew was unable to recover the aircraft from the
aerodynamic stall causing it to crash into a home outside
Buffalo. Baumeister & Samuels’ extensive experience in
commercial air carrier litigation was instrumental in
obtaining extremely significant recoveries on behalf of each
of our clients.
Comair Flight
5191
On August 27, 2006, Comair Flight 5191, a Bombardier CRJ 100
aircraft crashed after the flight crew attempted to depart
from the wrong runway at Blue Grass Airport in Lexington,
Kentucky. Although the plane was cleared to take off from
Runway 22, the flight crew attempted to depart from Runway
26, which was unlit and too short for the aircraft to
sustain sufficient lift. The aircraft impacted a berm at the
end of the short runway and crashed into an adjacent field.
Forty nine people were killed and only the First Officer who
was operating the controls as the aircraft rolled down the
dark unlit runway survived.
The sole controller on duty in the Tower cleared the plane
to taxi from the gate and instructed them to hold short of
the commercial runway before turning his back away from the
windows to work on non-operational administrative tasks.
Although the NTSB found the flight crew largely responsible
for the crash, it strongly criticized the conduct of the
controller who failed to notice that 5191 was stopped short
of the wrong runway, his failure to look up when he issued
the takeoff clearance to the flight crew which was another
opportunity to correct their attempt to take off from the
wrong runway, and his decision to instead prioritize
processing of traffic count paperwork that could have waited
until the aircraft departed.
Baumeister & Samuels took the lead role in the Comair 5191
litigation and was instrumental in conducting the most
significant discovery in the case as part of the Plaintiffs’
Executive Committee. Our efforts included taking dozens of
depositions of liability and expert witnesses, participating
in the preparation of the visual animation video, extensive
document review and coordination, and the drafting of all
legal briefs in preparation for trial. Given our extensive
involvement in the litigation, we were able to obtain
significant recoveries on behalf of the families we
represented in this tragedy.
Comair Flight
3272
During the Comair Flight 3272 litigation, attorneys from our
firm served as leading members of the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee to represent the interests of all the passengers
killed in the crash. We were also responsible for conducting
a significant portion of the pre-trial discovery for case.
On January 9, 1997, Comair Flight 3272, an Embraer Brasilia
(EMB-120) turboprop aircraft crashed on final approach to
the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport as the result
of an in-flight icing event. All 26 passengers and 3 crew
members were killed in the crash. Ice accretion on aircraft,
especially turboprop aircraft, has long been known
throughout the industry to significantly degrade aircraft
performance creating the potential for a catastrophic loss
of control. Unlike jet aircraft, turboprop aircraft use
pneumatic deice boots to remove ice from the aircraft’s
wings and tail. The deice boots inflate to break away ice
that has formed on each of these flight control surfaces.
Different from the pneumatic boot deice system, jet aircraft
use hot air from their engines to create a heated surface to
rid the jet of ice. The litigation involving Comair Flight
3272 focused on the issue of ice build-up on the aircraft,
the effectiveness of the pneumatic deice boot system, and
also examined flight crew’s conduct in response to an
in-flight icing event. Our extensive experience in cases
involving the in-flight loss of control that can result from
ice build-up on aircraft resulted in a very significant
recovery of monetary damages for our clients.
ValuJet Flight
592
On May 11, 1996, shortly after 2:00 PM, ValuJet Flight 592
departed Miami International Airport heading for Hartsfield
International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia with 105
passengers and 5 crew members. Among the victims were a
former San Diego Chargers running back and his wife, and a
cheerleader for the Kansas City Chiefs. Within just a few
minutes of departure, the cockpit voice recorder recovered
from the wreckage revealed that the flight crew heard a loud
bang in their headphones and observed that the aircraft was
losing electrical power. Within seconds, a flight attended
entered the cockpit to inform the flight crew of a fire in
the passenger cabin. Passengers can be heard shouting “fire”
on the recording. The flight crew immediately requested a
return to Miami due to increasing smoke in the cockpit and
cabin and they received instructions for a return. One
minute later, one of the pilots requested they be given
permission to land at the nearest airport. Eyewitnesses
nearby reported seeing the plane banked sharply, roll on its
side and nosedive at a near vertical angle into the Francis
S. Taylor Wildlife Management Area in the Everglades, a few
miles west of Miami.
The McDonnell Douglas DC-9 disappeared from radar at 2:13PM.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the
aircraft entered the swampy Everglades at more than 500
miles per hour. Evidence recovered at the site showed that
fire had burned through the floorboards in the cockpit
resulting in structural failure and damage to the cables
located underneath the instrument panels. The NTSB was
eventually able to determine that the fire that brought down
Flight 592 began in the cargo compartment below the
passenger cabin. The cargo compartment was designed so that
fire suppression could be achieved by sealing off the hold
from outside air which eliminated the need to equip the
cargo hold with smoke detectors. Just before takeoff,
expired chemical oxygen generators were placed inside the
cargo compartment by employees of SabreTech, a maintenance
contractor hired by ValuJet. These generators were inside
five boxes identifying them as “company owned material”. The
placement of these generators inside the cargo hold was a
direct violation of FAA regulations which expressly forbid
the transport of hazardous materials in aircraft cargo
holds. Moreover, FAA regulations required the placement of
plastic caps over the generators’ firing pins to make
accidental activation unlikely. The investigation revealed
that the SabreTech workers failed to cover the generators’
firing pins and that they noted on the cargo manifest that
the containers were “empty” instead of “expired”. The
difference is significant in that a byproduct of the
chemical reaction of the oxygen containers is that they
produce a great quantity of heat, enough to not only start a
fire but enough to keep a fire burning particularly in an
area without any form of fire suppression. Included in the
company owned materials on the cargo manifest were several
tires. The NTSB concluded that as a result of slight jolt to
the aircraft during taxi, one of the oxygen generators
activated, producing oxygen and heat which eventually
ignited the cardboard box in which it was packed allowing
the fire to start and ultimately spread throughout the
aircraft. The Safety Board found SabreTech responsible for
improperly packing and storing hazardous material, and also
determined that ValuJet’s failure to supervise SabreTech’s
employees contributed to the crash. It also strongly
recommended that the FAA enact regulations requiring smoke
detectors and fire suppression equipment inside cargo holds.
Baumeister & Samuels was retained to represent several
of the families of the victims. The lawsuits were
consolidated and assigned to be managed by a federal judge
in the Southern District of Florida. As discovery proceeded
in the civil lawsuits, our lawyers worked with our clients
to bring pressure on prosecutors to bring criminal charges
against SabreTech and two of its employees who improperly
packed and loaded the generators on board the plane. In
1997, a federal grand jury indicted SabreTech and the two
employees. Two years later, SabreTech was found guilty of
mishandling hazardous materials and improperly training its
employees. The company was fined $2 million dollars. One of
the workers failed to appear and remains a fugitive today.
SabreTech appealed its conviction and while the 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed its conviction on charges that it
mishandled hazardous materials, it upheld the conviction for
improper training. Following remand back to the federal
court, the company was indicted on 110 counts of
manslaughter and third degree murder by state prosecutors.
In a plea deal, SabreTech settled the state charges by
pleading no contest to a state charge of mishandling
hazardous waste and agreed to donate $500,000 to an aviation
safety group and a Miami-based charity.
Atlantic Southeast
Airlines Flight 7529
An Embraer 120 turboprop aircraft operating as Atlantic
Southeast Airlines Flight 7529, was climbing through 18,000
after taking off from Atlanta, Georgia on August 21, 1995,
when one of its propellers separated from the left engine
assembly and became imbedded in the leading edge of the
wing. Although the aircraft is designed to be able to fly
with a single engine, the distortion of the left engine as a
result of the propeller’s impact created excessive drag
which resulted in a loss of left on the side of the aircraft
forcing it to quickly lost altitude. The flight crew made an
emergency landing in a field near Carrollton, Georgia. All
of the passengers and crew survived the initial impact, but
were seriously injured or killed by the post-crash fire that
erupted less than a minute after the plane belly-landed.
During the discovery phase of the litigation, Mitch
Baumeister was the lead lawyer responsible for proving the
defendants’ liability. Dozens of depositions were taken and
it was revealed that the cause of the blade’s separation was
due to metal fatigue in the blade from corrosion. It was
also determined that the manufacturer of the propeller
blade, Hamilton Standard, had knowledge of two previous
failures of the same type of propeller. The blade that
failed on ASA Flight 7529 had undergone ultrasonic testing
shortly before the crash which resulted in it being rejected
and removed from the propeller. It was sent to Hamilton
Standard’s facility where it was refurbished incorrectly
before it was reinstalled on the EMB-120 turboprop aircraft.
Baumeister & Samuels represented a woman on board the
flight who survived the crash but suffered severe and life
altering burns. As a result of the firm’s work, we were
successful in securing for her and her family the largest
personal injury settlement in an aviation case.
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